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Terrorism and Democratic Recession 
Aziz Z. Huq† 
This Essay examines the potential causal mechanisms that plausibly link the 
occurrence of terrorism within a polity to that polity’s democratic decline. That 
causal pathway is often asserted in political rhetoric about terrorism. But such as-
sertions do not rest on a robust body of theory or empirical knowledge. I hypothesize 
three pathways along which acts of terrorism might lead to a decline in democratic 
practices. These three pathways work through the use of emergency powers, the as-
semblage of a repressive state apparatus, and the emergence of a populist style of 
politics adverse to democratic contestation. I tentatively conclude that terrorism is 
most likely to undermine democracy through its accelerating effect on state develop-
ment and its corrosive effect on democratic politics. Recognition of this possibility, I 
conclude, has implications for the doctrinal treatment of individual rights in the 
context of national security threats. 
INTRODUCTION 
The act of terrorism and the state of democracy are related 
in complex, dimly understood ways. Both claim lineage in 
Mediterranean antiquity.1 Yet each became symptomatic of global 
political practice only in the twentieth century. Each is also the 
others’ secret sharer. That is, each can be said to enable, plague, 
and even extinguish the other. One might think this rich, para-
doxical symbiosis ripe for academic tillage. But the potential 
causal linkages between democracy and terrorism remain une-
venly studied. We have sharply defined theory and solid empirical 
data about some. But, in other respects, we have only gauzy sup-
position unguided by a plausible theory of causation. 
 
 †  Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law 
School. Thanks to symposium participants for helpful responses and conversations, and to 
Brent Cooper and other editors at the Review for excellent edits. Support for this work was 
supplied by the Frank J. Cicero, Jr. Fund. 
 1 See Kurt A. Raaflaub, Josiah Ober, and Robert W. Wallace, Origins of Democ-
racy in Ancient Greece 11–14 (California 2007) (describing the connection between mod-
ern and Athenian democracy); Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, Zealots and Assas-
sins, in Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, eds, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity 
to ISIS 55, 55–78 (California 2d ed 2016) (illustrating the line between al-Qaeda and the 
origins of organized terrorism in first-century Palestine). 
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My aim in this Essay is to isolate and then unpack a single 
underappreciated strand of that complex relationship between 
terrorism and democracy, specifically the causal pathway that 
runs from terrorism to democratic decline. Although a staple of 
democratic political rhetoric, this possibility remains poorly un-
derstood. Its contours are vague, its descriptive force uncertain. 
By distinguishing this question from contiguous but distinct puz-
zles about the health of democratic systems, my hope is to offer 
the beginnings of a theoretical framework to enable clearer think-
ing about the terrorism–democracy nexus.  
In particular, this Essay sets out three potential mechanisms 
by which political violence might conduce to the democratic reces-
sion. To be clear up front, I cannot in the modest compass of this 
Essay offer conclusive empirical evidence for the operation of any 
one of these mechanisms. Instead, I hazard tentative estimates of 
their plausibility and force. Such estimates are open to testing—
and hence refutation—in the future. 
Whether or not such quantitative tests are feasible, the iden-
tification of plausible causal pathways from terrorism to demo-
cratic decline is, to my mind, an intrinsically important exercise. 
Not the least reason for this is practical. A democratic default 
seems undesirable and something that we should endeavor to 
evade. Another reason is doctrinal. Discussion of national secu-
rity law in the American legal academy is dominated by concerns 
about individual rights on one side and systemic security risks on 
the other. It is commonly assumed that the welfarist cost of secu-
rity risks materializing is larger than the cost to rights of effective 
prophylaxis.2 In part, this estimation is motivated by an assump-
tion that a terrorist attack will have (potentially) systemic effects, 
whereas counterterrorism efforts will not.3 But this framing of the 
debate can mislead seriously. As I aim to show here, there may 
well be systemic, even catastrophic, harms on both sides of the 
ledger, albeit ones sounding in different registers and working via 
 
 2 See, for example, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Se-
curity, Liberty, and the Courts 26–28 (Oxford 2007) (arguing for a “security-liberty” 
“tradeoff thesis” that recognizes the need for government to restrict civil liberties if faced 
with severe enough security threats in order to obtain an optimal level of public welfare); 
Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 Conn 
L Rev 1549, 1551 n 2 (2009) (recounting various scholars’ arguments in favor of strong 
executive powers in times of emergency). 
 3 Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 54–55 (cited in note 2) (identify-
ing political constraints that prevent an unbridled expansion of executive power during 
emergencies). 
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different pathways. Those who focus only on the systemic conse-
quences of terrorism, and not the systemic consequences of state 
responses, are committing a serious fallacy of omission.  
I.  ENTANGLEMENTS OF TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY: A 
TAXONOMY 
We can usefully start with a rough and approximate typology 
of causal pathways between democracy and terrorism. By estab-
lishing the lay of the land, this tripartite taxonomy underscores 
the complexity of their relationship. It also renders the specific 
mechanism that engages my interest in sharper contrast. 
To begin with, there is the possibility that terrorism can be 
deployed as a means to facilitate democratic creation. At the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, the Russian underground or-
ganization Narodnaya Volya deployed terrorism as a pathway to 
more populist, more egalitarian political arrangements.4 Self-
determination or some like ideal has similarly animated the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA),5 the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
(ETA),6 and the Zionist groups Irgun and Lehi.7 
This kind of a relationship between terrorism and democracy 
might also be discerned in violent efforts to restart a democracy 
that has either wholly failed or systematically let down a minority 
population. In India, for example, Ramachandra Guha glosses the 
extraordinary success of the Maoist Naxalite insurgency in re-
cruiting among tribal “adivasi” communities by showing that “the 
state has treated its adivasi citizens with contempt and conde-
scension.”8 According to Guha, the Naxalite rebellion began as a 
reaction to the failure of democratic norms.9 Alternatively, con-
sider the abrupt caesura in Algerian democracy in January 1991, 
which catalyzed a dizzying and bloody spiral into terrorism and 
 
 4 Daniel Gaido and Constanza Bosch Alessio, Vera Zasulich’s Critique of Neo-
populism: Party Organisation and Individual Terrorism in the Russian Revolutionary 
Movement (1878–1902), 23.4 Historical Materialism 93, 98 (2015). 
 5 Mark Hayes, The Evolution of Republican Strategy and the ‘Peace Process’ in 
Ireland, 39 Race & Class 21, 32 (Jan 1998). 
 6 Paddy Woodworth, Why Do They Kill? The Basque Conflict in Spain, 18 World Pol 
J 1, 7–8 (Spring 2001). 
 7 Steven Wagner, Whispers from Below: Zionist Secret Diplomacy, Terrorism and 
British Security inside and out of Palestine, 1944–47, 42 J Imperial & Commonwealth 
Hist 440, 443 (2014). 
 8 Ramachandra Guha, Adivasis, Naxalites and Indian Democracy, 42 Econ & Polit 
Weekly 3305, 3311 (2007). 
 9 Id at 3307–08. 
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ultimately civil war.10 In Algeria as well as India, terrorism has 
been deployed as a localized response to democratic failure. In 
this regard, it can be, although need not be, a tactic for redeeming 
democratic rule that has been abrogated or incompletely realized. 
(Whether it can work to this end is quite a different matter.) It 
should be no surprise that violence works as a substitute for de-
mocracy in this way. For it is a core function of democratic consti-
tutionalism to act as a forum for channeling and taming social 
conflict.11 The failure of democracy is therefore logically tied to the 
invocation of political violence. 
The second connection between terrorism and democracy 
treats them not as substitutes but complements of a sort. Several 
quantitative studies demonstrate that democracies are more at-
tractive targets for terrorism campaigns than autocratic regimes.12 
Moreover, even the limited introduction of democratic institu-
tions to an autocratic regime, at least under certain circum-
stances, induces an uptick in terrorist violence. Specifically, in 
dictatorships that experience relatively low levels of terrorism, 
political violence tends to increase when a regime allows the for-
mation of political parties but then denies them a legislative fo-
rum to air grievances.13 Democracy, in other words, can tend to 
breed terrorism as a response—at least under certain conditions.  
What explains the effect, and whether it is correlational or 
causal too, remains opaque. So far, there has been no evidence 
found for the most intuitive explanations, such as the possibility 
that it is democracies’ commitment to respecting civil and human 
rights that has a positive impact on terrorism rates.14 But the 
question is subject to ongoing and intensive investigation in the 
political science literature.15 
By contrast, a third entanglement between democracy and 
terrorism has received scant scholarly attention. At the same 
 
 10 Hugh Roberts, The Algerian State and the Challenge of Democracy, 27 Govt & Op-
position 433, 451–54 (1992). 
 11 Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq, Assessing Constitutional Performance, in Tom 
Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq, eds, Assessing Constitutional Performance 3, 18–20 
(Cambridge 2016). 
 12 See, for example, Erica Chenoweth, Terrorism and Democracy, 16 Ann Rev Polit 
Sci 355, 357–60 (2013). 
 13 Deniz Aksoy, David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright, Terrorism in Dictatorships, 74 
J Polit 810, 818 (2012). 
 14 See Chenoweth, 16 Ann Rev Polit Sci at 360–70 (cited in note 12) (surveying vari-
ous attempts to explain this phenomenon and identifying their shortcomings). 
 15 See id. 
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time, it occupies a recurrently prominent role in the political rhet-
oric of democratic responses to terrorism. It is also of immediate 
policy relevance, as much as either of the claims I have just out-
lined. It is the notion that terrorism can be democracy’s anti-
pode—the possibility that terrorism is related as a causal matter 
to democratic recessions. 
This idea, or a close analog, resurfaces often in the rhetorical 
responses to acts of spectacular terrorism in Europe and America. 
When the British Parliament—perhaps the most venerable global 
symbol of democracy, and almost certainly the oldest—was the 
site of an attack by a lone terrorist in March 2017, British Prime 
Minister Theresa May vowed not to let terrorism “silence our de-
mocracy.”16 In a similar vein, the European Council’s 2001 frame-
work decision on fighting terrorism cautions that “terrorism con-
stitutes a threat to democracy.”17 More recently, The New York 
Times editorial page in 2016 contended that the “greatest threat 
posed by terrorism [is] a descent into the lawless, hateful dema-
gogy of those who despise the West and its values” and urged its 
readers to “stay true to what democratic societies really stand for.”18 
Notwithstanding the frequency of its public invocation, the 
idea that terrorism leads to democratic failure has received little 
close scholarly attention. Several related questions therefore re-
main opaque: Is the idea that terrorism will “succeed” when a 
democratic regime is ousted in favor of another less democratic 
dispensation? Or is the worry that terrorism will catalyze some 
set of internal institutional or political dynamics that sap or con-
tradict necessary predicates of democracy? And if the latter, what 
might be the mechanisms? Which democracies are likely to be at 
the greatest risk? The idea that terrorism is a “threat” to democ-
racy, in short, is powerful rhetoric but has yet to be specified with 
precision. This, then, is the task at hand. 
 
 16 Lizzie Dearden, Theresa May Speech in Full: Prime Minister Says London Terror 
Attack Suspect ‘Tried to Silence Our Democracy’ (The Independent, Mar 23, 2017), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/HSR8-5CFA. The attack, in fact, largely occurred on the adjacent 
Westminster Bridge. 
 17 Council Framework Decision of June 13, 2002 on Combating Terrorism, 45 J EU 
L164 3 (2002).  
 18 Our Best Defense against Terrorists (NY Times, July 15, 2016), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/opinion/our-best-defense-against-terrorists 
.html?_r=0 (visited Jan 3, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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II.  GROUNDWORK: SOME DEFINITIONS AND A DISTINCTION 
It is helpful to begin by clarifying three key terms—terror-
ism, democracy, and democratic decline. Each is highly contested, 
in part because each depends not just on empirical, but on nor-
mative criteria. Having articulated the definitions that I will use 
for the purpose of this Essay, a useful distinction emerges that 
informs the balance of the analysis. 
The standard social science definition of terrorism, as devel-
oped and refined by Professor Alex Schmid, allows for both state 
and nonstate actors and hinges upon “fear-generating, coercive po-
litical violence . . . targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, 
performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on var-
ious audiences and conflict parties.”19 This definition captures the 
kind of political action I have in mind by using the term “terror-
ism.” But I focus here only on nonstate violence employed outside 
the context of an armed conflict, whether international or inter-
nal.20 Instances wherein terrorism accelerates so as to become in-
distinguishable from civil war fall outside my purview here. Ra-
ther, paradigmatic cases of terrorism include al-Qaeda, ISIS, 
ETA, the IRA, the Italian Red Brigades, the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK), and the Maoist Naxalites. All unfurl within a con-
text of persisting democratic contestation. 
One important distinction among these cases concerns the 
degree of public support for a given terrorist organization within 
a polity. Whereas groups like the PKK and Naxalites maintain 
substantial support among specific populations defined typically 
by ethnicity or class, other groups—most importantly, ISIS and 
al-Qaeda—lack any numerically substantial basis of support 
within democratic countries.21 The nature of the threat to demo-
cratic rule may well vary depending on the extent of potential and 
actual indigenous support. 
 
 19 Alex P. Schmid, The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism, 6 Persp 
Terrorism 158, 158 (May 2012). 
 20 For the threshold of “armed conflict,” see Decision on the Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, *36–37 at 
¶¶ 67, 70 (Intl Crim Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Oct 2, 1995) (“[A]n armed conflict 
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State [with a scope that] extends beyond the exact time and place 
of hostilities.”). 
 21 See Jacob Poushter, Support for al Qaeda Was Low before (and after) Osama Bin 
Laden’s Death (Pew Research Center, May 2, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/M6CK-7RBB; 
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Next, “democracy” remains as contentious a term as “ter-
rorism.” I define “democracy” for present purposes in relatively 
parsimonious terms to include three necessary elements: (1) a 
democratic electoral system involving periodic free and fair elec-
tions in which a losing side cedes power; (2) liberal rights to 
speech and association related directly to political contestation; 
and (3) stable, predictable, and noncorrupt administrative agen-
cies and courts capable of managing electoral competition without 
fear or coercion.22 
This definition captures the bare institutional necessities of 
democracy as a going concern. But it eschews controversial claims 
about the traits of individual citizens or governmental size predi-
cates of democratic practice. It is hence meant to be as minimal 
as possible—albeit not excessively parsimonious—while retain-
ing a measure of functional plausibility. So, I think that it is im-
possible to conceive of an effective democracy without the speech 
and associational rights typically exercised through political con-
testation. Perhaps more controversially, I also think it is impos-
sible to imagine a democracy without some measure of bureau-
cratic apparatus with which to manage free and fair elections.23 
In contrast, I do think that democracy can exist with highly im-
perfect “horizontal” accountability—that is, a system in which 
“some properly authorized state institutions act to prevent, re-
dress, or punish the presumably illegal actions (or inactions) of 
public officials.”24 Indeed, I think we presently lack a comprehen-
sive system of horizontal accountability in the United States to-
day,25 yet it is the consensus view among most scholars and ob-
servers that we still have a democracy of sorts. 
 
Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism (Pew Re-
search Center, Aug 30, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/NS4C-A2E8. 
 22 See Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 
UCLA L Rev *9 (forthcoming 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/N67G-B5UK (providing 
the same definition of democracy and calling it “constitutional liberal democracy”). 
 23 See Guillermo O’Donnell, Why the Rule of Law Matters, 15 J Democracy 32, 37 
(Oct 2004) (“[V]ertical electoral accountability . . .  results from fair and institutionalized 
elections, through which citizens may change the party and officers in government.”). 
 24 Id (arguing that vertical accountability is required by definition in a democracy, 
but horizontal accountability can “vary across cases and time periods”). 
 25 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Rem-
edies, 65 Duke L J 1, 71–74 (2015) (concluding that litigants levying ex ante facial chal-
lenges to laws face fewer transaction costs than do litigants seeking remedies or injunc-
tions against individuals or institutions engaged in unconstitutional practices). See also 
generally Aziz Z. Huq and Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 Harv L Rev (forthcom-
ing 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/LR5X-3GER (extending this analysis across consti-
tutional and federal criminal law). 
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Finally, the idea of a democratic decline or recession rests on 
the assumption that a status quo ante of democracy (as defined 
above) exists and that it suffers a substantial degradation in qual-
ity along one or more of the three margins I have identified above. 
Importantly, a decline need not be a collapse. Democracy is a con-
tinuous, not a binary, variable. If a democratic drop-off is abso-
lute, it is what Professor Tom Ginsburg and I have elsewhere la-
beled an “authoritarian reversion.”26 If it is incremental, it is what 
I have labeled a “retrogression.”27 
Here, I am interested in both possibilities of complete rever-
sion and also creeping retrogression. But there must be some 
threshold below which a quantum of backsliding does not merit 
consideration within the scope of my analysis. The United States, 
for example, has fluctuated in democratic quality over the past 
fifty years since the passage of the Voting Rights Act28 and the 
formal enfranchisement of African Americans after decades of 
Jim Crow. Many of these changes are dismaying, although not 
large enough in magnitude or sufficiently geographically exten-
sive to be examples of national retrogression. Rather, I assume 
that the last few decades represent a high water mark in demo-
cratic inclusion, and that retrogression occurs if there is a marked 
and substantial downward shift in democratic quality of a kind 
not seen in the past four or five decades. 
Looking around the world, it is clear that democratic decline 
is a real concern. Whereas complete reversions are rare, substan-
tial retrogressions are surprisingly common. Using POLITY data, 
Ginsburg and I have identified thirty-seven recent instances of 
retrogression across twenty-five countries, including democracies 
like the United States, Sri Lanka, India, Israel, and Ireland.29 A 
2011 study focused on a thirty-year window, and identified cases 
of democratic backsliding in fifty-three countries.30 It is worth 
noting (although hardly conclusive) that several of the democra-
cies in which backsliding is observed, including some of those 
listed above, simultaneously experienced significant terrorism 
 
 26 Huq and Ginsburg, 65 UCLA L Rev at *5–6 (cited in note 22). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (1965), codified as amended at 52 USC § 10101 et seq. 
 29 Huq and Ginsburg, 65 UCLA L Rev at *38 (cited in note 22). 
 30 Gero Erdmann, Decline of Democracy: Loss of Quality, Hybridisation and Break-
down of Democracy, in Gero Erdmann and Marianne Kneuer, eds, Regression of Democ-
racy? 21, 26 (Comparative Governance and Politics 2011). 
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threats. This suggests, at minimum, the possibility of a relevant 
correlation. 
With these definitions of democracy and democratic decline 
on the table, we can usefully distinguish the problem of demo-
cratic decline from another question that is commonly pursued in 
legal scholarship on terrorism. The central question in this schol-
arship is the relationship of security measures to individual in-
terests, usually in the form of civil or human rights, rather than 
systemic qualities, such as democracy. These are distinct ques-
tions. Even if a democracy entails the availability of some rights, 
it is not reducible to the existence of such rights. Rights, mean-
while, can be obtained even absent democratic processes (and in-
deed, at times, are imperiled by the very exercise of democracy). 
Existing debate on the relationship between terrorism and 
rights is arrayed between two poles. On one side of this debate 
are those who worry that responses to terrorism will often be 
excessive, imposing ultimately needless burdens on suspect pop-
ulations.31 On the other side are scholars who claim that recali-
brations of state power in response to terrorism threats tend to be 
welfare enhancing, so that there is little reason to install institu-
tional checks, such as judicial or legislative oversight.32 
The resulting debate about the magnitude of and justification 
for liberty, dignity, and privacy deprivations resulting from coun-
terterrorism measures is, in my view, largely distinct as a concep-
tual and empirical matter from the question of democracy’s 
maintenance. Indeed, it is telling that scholars who argue for 
maximal state power, and hence are most willing to tolerate high 
rates of rights infringements, appear to assume the persistence of 
democratic accountability through terrorism campaigns in fram-
ing their argument for extensive state power.33 They assume, that 
 
 31 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the 
Sedition Act of 1789 to the War on Terrorism (Norton 2004). See also Oren Gross, Chaos 
and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 Yale L J 
1011, 1031 (2003) (contending that the overreaction of democracies to terrorism may im-
peril democracy). 
 32 See Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 53–57 (cited in note 2). 
 33 This is evident in Professors Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s discussion of 
the panic and democratic failure mechanisms—both of which assume the persistence of 
democratic accountability. Id at 73–77 (discussing insulation of lawmakers under the 
panic theory); id at 87–90 (discussing democratic failure theory). Posner and Vermeule, 
however, make strong assumptions about (1) the rationality of the democratic public, 
(2) their willingness to engage in retrospective voting, (3) the availability of information 
necessary for the exercise of such voting, and (4) the absence of elite cuing effects or par-
tisan polarization. Their scant regard for the observed operation of the political checks is 
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is, that democratic accountability is not corroded though the ex-
tensive violation of individual liberties—especially when predict-
ably allocated to a minority group. While this argument is deeply 
flawed, it demonstrates a common belief in the possible coexist-
ence of democracy along with widespread rights infringements. 
A gap between threats to individual rights and impingements 
on democratic practice also becomes apparent when one examines 
discrete case studies and also when one looks at larger empirical 
trends. In the context of twentieth-century security crises in the 
United States, for example, fairly discretely defined ethnic or re-
ligious minorities have typically borne the burden of security- 
related rights deprivations.34 But a democracy can exclude racial, 
religious, or ethnic minorities and remain, in substantial measure, 
a democracy (if a morally iniquitous one). State-coordinated cam-
paigns of coercion and intimidation against Japanese Americans, 
Muslim Americans, or Eastern European migrants across the last 
century are not commonly viewed as lapses in democracy: instead, 
they illustrate how democracy in action can be prone to moral 
failure, written off as just another instance of necessarily dirty 
hands.35 Some rights are certainly necessary to democracy 
(whether defined as such or not), and some of those rights may 
well be undermined by counterterrorism responses. But these ex-
amples suggest that the derogatory treatment of a minority pop-
ulation—however unwarranted and even reprehensible on its 
own terms—is not the same as a substantial rollback of democ-
racy. It is only when the minority is sufficiently numerous that 
their disenfranchisement can be ranked as a blow to democracy 
per se. 
 
in stark contrast to their purportedly hardheaded analysis of security risks. More force-
fully put, by idealizing political checks and by casting legal checks in the worst light pos-
sible, Posner and Vermeule bias their analysis to an inevitable result. The internal inco-
herence of their argument substantially undermines its force. 
 34 See, for example, Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat 153 (limiting the immigration 
of persons from Southern and Eastern Europe); Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214, 
217–18 (1944) (finding constitutional the detention of persons of Japanese descent); 
Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662, 667–68 (2008) (describing the detention of several hundred 
Arab Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11). 
 35 See Aziz Huq, The Uses of Religious Identity, Practice, and Dogma in ‘Soft’ and 
‘Hard’ Counterterrorism, in Liora Lazarus and Benjamin Goold, eds, Security and Human 
Rights *5–10 (Hart forthcoming 2018) (on file with author) (considering how the modern 
counterterrorism apparatus tends to view Islam as a signal for risk, an object of reform, 
or an object of extirpation). 
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While quantitative studies suggest that a connection does ob-
tain between democracy and human-rights compliance, they fur-
ther hint that their relationship is not a linear one. Only when 
highly consolidated does democracy correlate with improved hu-
man rights.36 When weak, in contrast, democracy has no impact 
on the level of rights violations.37 Complicating matters further, 
even consolidated democracies can violate rights at high rates 
when faced with a terrorist threat.38 Given the tendency of demo-
cratic publics to rally around leaders in times of crisis and the 
manner in which terrorism triggers broad mortality salience and 
authoritarian sentiments, it might well be expected that democ-
racies would be no less likely than nondemocratic polities to en-
gage in repressive measures.39 Consistent with this intuition, 
greater levels of state violence are associated with swelling public 
support for repressive measures.40 
While distinct from the question I have framed here about 
democratic decline, this existing debate about rights and terror-
ism does implicate questions of democracy’s quality in one re-
spect. The scholars engaged in this demand are implicitly making 
claims about the way in which democratic publics are likely to 
respond to security threats: either by rationally demanding cost-
justified security measures or by allowing invidious stereotypes 
and cognitive biases to influence their choices—and the way in 
which governmental actors will respond—by making decisions 
based on expertise or not. Their debate is, at some level, about the 
competing relevance of emotional and epistemic springs of deci-
sions in democracies. But it is still one that simply assumes the 
continued operation of democracy. 
In sum, the question whether terrorism leads to substantial 
damage to democracy is one that can be defined with a tolerable 
 
 36 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, et al, Thinking inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democ-
racy and Human Rights, 49 Intl Stud Q 439, 450 (2005). 
 37 Christian Davenport and David A. Armstrong II, Democracy and the Violation of 
Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996, 48 Am J Polit Sci 538, 542 (2004). 
 38 Chenoweth, 16 Ann Rev Polit Sci at 362 (cited in note 12) (discussing how democ-
racies grant the executive expanded powers after terrorist acts, with examples from Israel 
and the United Kingdom). 
 39 Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Cal L Rev 887, 
935–43 (2012). 
 40 Bart Schuurman, Defeated by Popular Demand: Public Support and Counterter-
rorism in Three Western Democracies, 1963–1998, 36 Stud Conflict & Terrorism 152, 163–
65 (2013) (presenting the turn of public opinion against the Front de Libération du Québec 
as an example of this phenomenon). 
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degree of precision and distinguished from the currently domi-
nant rights-related debate about emergency powers. Given the 
nontrivial risk of democratic decline that exists today,41 this 
raises the question whether a pathway can be traced from the oc-
currence of political violence to democratic decline. 
III.  MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
TERRORISM THREATS 
The relationship between terrorism and democratic decline 
might be studied using either econometric methods or more gran-
ular case studies. A concern with the former might be that the 
number of available examples of democratic decline is relatively 
small, and the causes of such decline are almost certainly plural 
and complex. As a result, econometric techniques are not always 
well matched to available data. It may well be just as useful to 
develop illustrative case studies and local observations to offer a 
suite of potential mechanisms whereby terrorism might induce 
democratic recession. This is the approach I take. 
This inductive approach has risks. Ascriptions of causality 
must be more tentative, and concerns about external validity 
loom large. Yet history is a storehouse of political tactics for con-
temporary actors. Even a single example of successful assault on 
democracy may prove influential because later decisionmakers 
consciously choose to imitate it. Case studies, in particular, of 
high-salience examples may therefore be surprisingly predictive, 
and perhaps even more trenchantly illuminating than the normal 
run of econometric tools. 
I see three specific mechanisms whereby the use of terrorism 
as a tactic has an effect on the strength of democracy as a systemic 
quality of political arrangements. Each involves a slightly differ-
ent species of institutional change, and each has a distinct and 
different pace and timeframe. The first concerns the rapid deploy-
ment of formal emergency powers. The second hinges on changes 
to the forms of institutionalized coercive authority adopted in re-
sponse to perceived terrorist threats. The third, by contrast, 
courses through a public, political channel, and pertains to shifts 
in the rhetoric deployed in electoral campaigns, and subtle shifts 
in the strategies of legitimation employed by elected leaders. In 
the end, I am skeptical that the first, and in some ways most 
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obvious and salient to law professors, is in practice all that im-
portant. The other two mechanisms, however, seem to me im-
portant potential objects of future research. 
A. Triggering Emergency Powers 
In the first pathway, a terrorism event provides a trigger for 
the exercise of emergency powers that constrict or suppress polit-
ical competition. In its simplest iteration, a terrorism event oc-
curs and the government responds not only with detention and 
coercion of putatively suspect communities but also with a more 
general constriction on rights of speech and association necessary 
to democratic governance. This is a close cousin to the emergency 
powers/civil liberties question already explored in the legal schol-
arship.42 But it is distinct insofar as the cost of security measures 
is not tallied in terms of discrete infringements on individual 
rights, but rather in terms of systemic distortions in the function-
ing of the political system. 
The highest-profile examples of this mechanism arise in early 
twentieth-century Germany and arguably also in contemporary 
Russia and Turkey. First, take the obvious example. On February 
27, 1933, the German Reichstag building burned to “ruins,” alleg-
edly at the hands of a young Dutch anarcho-syndicalist, Marinus 
van der Lubbe.43 A “massive” round-up of alleged leftists started 
that day.44 The next day, President Paul von Hindenburg signed 
a decree suspending “key” articles of the Weimar Constitution 
and starting “[t]he Nazi seizure of power . . . in earnest.”45 The 
threat of leftist violence embodied in the Reichstag fire was sig-
nificant, additionally, not only because it provided an occasion for 
Hindenburg’s decree but also because it deepened the “wide-
spread” fear of “communist ‘terrorism.’”46 This in turn led civil so-
ciety groups and conservative politicians to lend broad support to 
the Nazi’s subsequent constrictions on democratic practice.47 
More recently, the historian Timothy Snyder has identified a 
parallel dynamic at work in the consolidation of political power 
within Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 
 
 42 See text accompanying notes 31–33. 
 43 Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich 328–29 (Penguin 2003). 
 44 Id at 331. 
 45 Id at 333. 
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Turkey.48 In the Russian context, Snyder suggests that attacks on 
apartment buildings in 1999 provided a platform for Putin’s 
Chechnya campaign, which in turn cemented his fragile popular-
ity.49 There are other examples: Another terrorist attack killed 40 
only two days before the 2003 parliamentary elections.50 And in 
the wake of the 2005 Beslan hostage crisis, in which 150 children 
died, Putin invoked the terrorist threat to propose “radical 
changes” in Russia’s state structure that stripped all of its prov-
inces of power while greatly strengthening the central institu-
tions under Putin’s direct control.51 In Turkey, the precipitating 
event that Snyder cites was not terrorism. Rather, the Erdoğan 
government responded to a violent coup attempt in July 2016 by 
purging or detaining 9,000 police officers, 21,000 private school 
teachers, over 10,000 soldiers, 2,745 judges, 1,500 university 
deans, and 21,700 Ministry of Education officials.52 In the wake of 
these purges, Erdoğan sought and won a referendum on constitu-
tional amendments that increased dramatically his authority as 
president.53 
The German, Russian, and Turkish cases present plausible 
examples of democratic decline. But it is far from clear to me that 
terrorism (or, in Turkey, the threat of a military putsch) played a 
decisive role in their trajectories. In Turkey, for example, smaller 
purges of Erdoğan opponents had occurred before the 2016 coup 
attempt.54 Had concerns about terrorism been causally related to 
Turkish democracy’s decline, one might have expected this con-
nection to be clearest in relation to Erdoğan’s policy toward the 
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PKK. But this is not the case. Erdoğan’s approach to the Kurdish 
question has included both periods of attempted rapprochement 
and periods of intensified conflict.55 Hence, while a pathway away 
from democratic competition that relied on fears of Kurdish ter-
rorism can be imagined—and indeed, these fears played a role in 
the 2017 constitutional referendum campaign56—Erdoğan’s con-
solidation of political power has largely been motivated and ex-
plained by other considerations. 
In Russia, similarly, the public desire for a “strong” leader 
like Putin that fueled his initial election victories was only par-
tially motivated by concerns about terrorism.57 Liberal opposition 
parties declined in popularity during the early 2000s in large part 
because of their own strategic blunders.58 Doubts have been also 
raised about whether pivotal terrorism events in Russia, such as 
the 1999 apartment bombings, were in fact the work of nonstate 
actors or instead manufactured by the FSB, Russia’s principal se-
curity agency.59 
Similarly, even the example of the Reichstag fire proves am-
biguous. Although historians continue to disagree on the question 
of its origins, there is an increasing body of evidence that rather 
than van de Lubbe, the Nazi Party itself was responsible for the 
fire.60 Without attempting to resolve the question, it suffices here 
to say that the scale of the Nazi response to the Reichstag fire 
reflected not the precise contours of the threat to order that had 
in fact manifested, but rather an extant Nazi agenda to suppress 
political opposition of all stripes. 
A regime committed to unraveling democracy can employ ter-
rorism as an instrument in this campaign. But it does not need 
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an actual external threat to do so. Imagined or manufactured con-
spiracies may do just as well. Moreover, even when security con-
cerns are invoked, in practice it is unclear whether they have any 
significant effect on the trajectory of system-level aspects of the 
polity. It may well be that a regime or a leader inclined to treat 
terrorism as a trigger for the effectual contraction of democratic 
contestation is weakly committed to political pluralism in the first 
instance. Such a leader might fall off the democracy wagon sooner 
or later even without a looming security concern. Hence, this first 
potential causeway between terrorism and democratic decline 
seems a relatively unpromising one. 
B. Reconfiguring the State’s Repressive Capabilities 
The second pathway is subtler. It wants for spectacular ex-
amples like the Reichstag fire and its aftermath. It is the possi-
bility that the prospect of terrorism leads governments to intro-
duce system-level reforms to state structure that, in the medium 
and long term, make a move away from democracy easier to 
achieve. The relevant changes to state institutions that respond 
to terrorism might be technological in character. For example, 
they might involve the acquisition of new forms of surveillance or 
coercive authorities. But in my view, they are more likely to be 
institutional in nature. Indeed, institutional change might be sig-
nificant even if the underlying authority being exercised remains 
roughly unchanged. 
The basic intuition animating this mechanism is familiar 
from the context of military coups. A military apparatus that de-
veloped to meet a specific external threat may become a destabi-
lizing element within a wider and more heterogeneous democratic 
context once the threat has abated. In Pakistan, for instance, the 
army’s broad prestige and political dominance (even in times of 
putative civilian rule) flowed from the dominance of geostrate-
gic issues—most importantly, the perceived military threat of 
India—at the time of the nation’s birth.61 The external threat in-
duced institutional choices that diminished the possibility of sta-
ble democratic rule. This is not, however, the only way a destabi-
lizing military presence can coalesce. In Turkey, by contrast, an 
underground network called the Committee of Union and Progress 
formed the backbone of anti-Ottoman mobilization around the 
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turn of the twentieth century, and then, having successfully over-
thrown the Sultan, went on to form what has been called a “deep 
state” within the new Kemalist republic.62 
In the terrorism context, the Italian state’s response to the 
Red Brigade insurgency of the late 1970s represents a concrete 
example of hazardous reconfigurations of institutional arrange-
ments. This entailed the creation of “a nationwide network of 
armed neo-Fascist groups,” which ultimately turned their pur-
poses to “a fully fledged coup d’état” aimed at reestablishing 
“Mussolini-style government in a ‘born-again’ Salo Republic.”63 
Paradoxically, development of this parastatal apparatus flowed 
from state weakness—the postwar “structural ‘unpreparedness’ 
of the Italian police.”64 It is a nice irony that an impulse to profes-
sionalize the security apparatus should so directly induce a grave 
risk of democratic backsliding. 
The Italian example is clearly an extreme case. It may thus be 
helpful to set forth some (hypothetical) examples of more nuanced 
ways in which terrorism emergencies can lead to the reconfigura-
tion of state power and present a risk to democratic stability.  
Two more mundane and plausible dynamics can be imagined. 
First, a government might respond to a terrorism threat by 
changing the manner in which a certain surveillance authority is 
used such that its deployment no longer requires judicial author-
izations and no longer creates a record of its retail justifications 
and the extent of the resulting intrusions on private communica-
tions and files. The new surveillance authority might be employed 
with ease to gather information on political adversaries, which 
can either be leaked to inflict political damage or withheld to 
blackmail specific individuals. 
Second, one common response to a terrorism event is to cre-
ate a mechanism for proscribing certain organizations, foreign 
or domestic, that are affiliated in some fashion with terrorist or-
ganizations.65 Ex ante designation, with attendant fiscal and 
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criminal sanctions, might be a rough substitute for the ex post use 
of inchoate criminal offenses, such as conspiracy and material 
support, as a means to target group-based security threats. But 
ex ante measures of this sort necessarily depend on speculative 
rather than historical judgments. They are hence more likely to 
court error and even partisan misuse. 
In both of these hypothetical examples, the basic surveillance 
or regulatory authority being deployed has not changed. What 
has shifted are the institutional circumstances in which that 
power is exercised. In both instances, backdrop institutional 
changes make the authority a more potent instrument of demo-
cratic erosion. Surveillance of journalists and regime critics has 
become easier in the first hypothetical. The risk of active suppres-
sion of oppositional domestic civil-society elements as affiliates or 
alter egos of designated groups has increased in the second hypo-
thetical.66 In both cases, the expected cost of coordinated public 
enforcement of constitutional norms has increased.67 
Both of these hypotheticals involve the elimination of ex ante 
safeguards on the improper use of a security power for antidemo-
cratic ends. Alternative reforms might also raise parallel con-
cerns. For example, a reform catalyzed by a terrorism event might 
reallocate a power from an institution relatively insulated from 
politics to one in the immediate control of elected officials. Or a 
reform might remove ex post forms of accountability. The latter 
ranges from disclosure requirements respecting the frequency 
and scope of erroneous or unjustified applications of a specific se-
curity power to individual remedies sounding either in terms of 
declaratory relief or money damages. 
Once adopted by the state, moreover, any of these institu-
tional recalibrations may be difficult to wind back. This is espe-
cially so when they redound to the benefit of factions either within 
or outside government. The latter can, and often do, use privi-
leged access to information or political decisionmakers to resist 
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even plainly warranted changes in institutional form.68 The result 
is a sticky “path dependence” in that institutional form.69 
This path-dependent effect will be especially pronounced if 
the political system is characterized by plural veto-gates, and, as 
a result, tends toward policy sclerosis.70 Under such conditions, 
exogenous shocks like terrorist attacks will generate important 
windows for policy and institutional change. Moreover, if the 
manner in which security-related powers are deployed changes 
largely in response to exogenous security shocks, it is also likely 
that the pattern of resulting changes will be asymmetrically tilted 
toward enabling change. Further, when policy change is hard to 
achieve via ordinary political channels, incumbent elected actors 
may find it more attractive to align themselves with, or to provoke 
the intervention of, nondemocratic security agencies.71 
A potential objection to this second pathway from terrorism 
to democratic decline is once again the concern that institutional 
responses to terrorism events are epiphenomenal. The slide away 
from democracy, this counterargument would go, is caused by 
independent forces, and will not be either retarded or delayed 
much by exogenous shocks. Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford 
Levinson, for example, have described a “national surveillance 
state” in the United States, but caution against the view that the 
latter flows from specific terrorism events.72 Rather, they contend, 
“new technologies of surveillance, data storage, and computation 
that arrived on the scene in the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury” have motivated the development of their national surveil-
lance state.73 The marginal effect of specific political responses to 
terrorism, on their view, is minimal. 
 
 68 Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv L Rev 641, 
651–52 (1996) (“Either information or public choice barriers could induce strong-form path 
dependence.”). 
 69 Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q J Polit Sci 87, 97 (2006) (defining “path de-
pendence” as a “process” in which “the outcome in any period depends on history and can 
depend on their order”). 
 70 Aziz Z. Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 Cal L Rev 1401, 
1422 (2016). 
 71 See, for example, C. Christine Fair, Why the Pakistan Army Is Here to Stay: Pro-
spects for Civilian Governance, 87 Intl Aff 571, 576–77 (2011) (discussing how the insta-
bility of Pakistani politics incentivizes opposition parties to use army intervention to dis-
solve governments early and obtain victories in early elections). 
 72 See Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: 
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 Fordham L Rev 489, 
522 (2006). 
 73 Id. 
476 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:457 
 
Balkin and Levinson are right to stress secular trends, such 
as technological change. But I think it is a mistake to think that 
the specific configurations of new powers are unaffected by exog-
enous shocks or the institutional reorganizations they set in mo-
tion. That is, Balkin and Levinson are in my view too quick to 
draw an unhindered plumb line between technological change 
and institutional metamorphoses. Policy change is more complex 
a process, and more uncertain in result, than they let on. There 
are many instances, both large and small, in which the specific 
configuration of security-related powers is crucially determined 
by specific and contingent decisions taken under the aegis of 
emergency. History, unlike the executive power portrayed by 
Balkin and Levinson, knows no iron law of necessity. 
It is, for example, well known that the September 2001 at-
tacks catalyzed a suite of novel aggregate surveillance measures, 
most of which were subsequently integrated into domestic law de-
spite initial controversy.74 It seems plausible to think that the pro-
grams installed after 9/11, which became a baseline against 
which policy proposals were judged, shaped the form and extent 
of regulation of new surveillance powers. Of course, we cannot 
know what would have happened absent the 2001 attacks, but the 
causal arrow observed in practice is tolerably strong. 
Consider a further example: Federal law enforcement agen-
cies have strenuously argued in recent years for new and im-
proved forms of access to encrypted communications and data-
storage devices through the creation of “keys” to access such data 
upon issuance of a warrant.75 Cryptographers in the academy and 
in industry have resisted this proposal on the grounds that any 
compromising of end-to-end encryption would impose greater so-
cial cost than the deterrence obtained by easier access to devices.76 
The law enforcement push failed, notwithstanding an attempt to 
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leverage a high-profile fracas over one of the San Bernardino ter-
rorists’ iPhones.77 In the wake of that failed effort, a senior lawyer 
within the intelligence community cautioned his colleagues pri-
vately to await “the event of a terrorist attack or criminal event 
where strong encryption can be shown to have hindered law en-
forcement.”78 His comments suggest that actors within agencies are 
perfectly aware that exogenous security shocks provide political 
platforms for reengineering the scope of coercive authorities—as 
well as being well positioned to capitalize on those opportunities. 
Another objection to this pathway from terrorism to demo-
cratic decline might focus on the relation between the misuse of 
new security powers and the quality of democracy. On this ac-
count, terrorism might influence the quality of official accounta-
bility for wrongdoing consistent with some notion of the rule of law, 
but it is irrelevant to the problem of “vertical” accountability.79  
But new technologies of coercion can and do dampen demo-
cratic participation in significant ways. China’s experience with 
social media regulation is but the most familiar example.80 A use-
ful analogy comes from the municipal policing context. There, 
evidence suggests that negative contact with the police has a de-
moralizing and alienating effect, in particular on young African 
American men.81 This effect is reinforced by a number of ways in 
which aggressive street policing using stops undermines the trust 
in the state and community cohesion necessary for effectual polit-
ical action.82 What I suggest here is simply that the same political 
suppression can occur, under the right institutional conditions, 
on a somewhat grander scale. 
I have offered here examples from the US context of terrorism 
creating the conditions for political entrepreneurs to secure new 
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institutional configurations of security-related powers. In doing 
so, though, I do not want to suggest that these particular powers 
are now or have previously been employed in ways subversive to 
American democracy. Perhaps they are, although I cannot 
demonstrate this to be so here. My point is more modest: this sort 
of evolutionary process of institutional development, under the 
right circumstances, may well yield in the medium term a terrain 
of governing bodies primed for and conducive to substantial ret-
rogression in democratic norms, if not outright collapse.  
This dynamic occurs in a longer timeframe than the direct 
policy responses to a security emergency and is hence less visible 
to citizens and scholars. Its deleterious effect on democratic 
norms is incremental and probabilistic in character. Neverthe-
less, I do not think it is overly speculative to be concerned about 
the democratic costs of new security measures when viewed in the 
medium term. 
C. Terrorism and Populism 
The third, and perhaps most interesting, pathway between 
terrorism and democratic decline flows, paradoxically, through 
democratic politics itself rather than via an institutional design 
choice. The eruption of terrorism, on this account, conduces to a 
new style of populist politics in the medium term. In turn, politi-
cians selected by dint of their populist appeals tend to be averse 
to the main tenets of democracy as I have defined it. Even if this 
relationship between terrorism and the adoption of antisystem 
policy positions is a contingent rather than a necessary one, it is 
a correlation that holds with some rigidity in the current geopo-
litical moment. It generates a medium-term dynamic that might 
run roughly concurrent to the process of institutional transform-
ration just canvassed. 
Populism has emerged as a potent political form in both Europe 
and North America in the last decade.83 But it has a longer pedigree. 
It can be seen earlier in Latin America,84 Asia,85 and also in earlier 
twentieth-century Europe.86 Populism is not a well-defined term. In 
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a cogent recent effort at definitional clarity, Professor Jan-Werner 
Müller has argued that an axiomatic characteristic of populist 
politics is the belief in the existence of a “true” people genuinely 
and completely represented by a singular party or leader, and a 
corresponding rejection of competitive elections and the possibil-
ity of legitimate political opposition.87  
Agreeing with Müller, Professor Nadia Urbinati has argued 
that successful populism tends to “change, and even shatter con-
stitutional democracy” through the “centralization of power, 
weakening of checks and balances, disregard of political opposi-
tion, and the transformation of election [into] a plebiscite of the 
leader.”88 These definitions provide analytically crisp means of 
isolating distinct threats to democratic stability.89 
Populist regimes can be discerned today in Venezuela, 
Hungary, Russia, and Poland—all countries that have experi-
enced recent substantial democratic retrogression under populist 
rule.90 In France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
populist movements have either achieved significant policy or 
electoral triumphs in the past two years, without (for now) sub-
stantial backward movement in democratic quality.91 
Populism has left- and right-wing variants; in Greece, for ex-
ample, Syriza and Golden Dawn respectively occupy these posi-
tions.92 The connection between terrorism and democratic decline 
is most apparent with the latter organization. In Europe, in-
creasing support for populism is associated with negative views 
of immigrants. Right-of-center populist parties like the Dansk 
Folkeparti, the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the 
Future of Austria), and the Dutch Party for Freedom coalesce 
around restrictive immigration measures aimed at stanching 
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Muslim migration, partly in the name of ensuring security.93 Such 
sentiments are strongly linked to perceptions of terrorism risk. 
The recognition and stoking of public fear of such violent disorder 
is a central element of the emotional appeal of right-of-center 
populism.94 
Hence, population-wide surveys in European countries find 
that perceptions of a security threat from Islamic terrorism pre-
dicted negative views toward Muslim migrants.95 More specifi-
cally, quasi-experimental studies show that media exposure to 
high-profile terrorism events, even in nations that have not ex-
perienced that political violence directly, causes increased anti-
immigrant sentiments.96 This study found the effect to peak in 
geographic areas that have experienced recent spikes in unem-
ployment.97 Today, some of the highest levels of anti-immigrant 
sentiment are found in Eastern Europe, which has experienced 
spikes of support for populist candidates at the polls.98 
In this third causal pathway, terrorism is not a direct cause 
of democratic decline. Rather, terrorism events, whether local or 
global, serve as a backdrop that is especially conducive to the po-
litical rise of parties and leaders that do not accept basic tenets of 
democracy. This is, however, not to suggest that even if such lead-
ers come to power, they will necessarily be successful in presiding 
over institutional changes that narrow democratic space. In the 
US context, for example, Professor Ginsburg and I have argued 
that the risk of democratic regression is a function not simply of 
constitutional design flaws (although there are plenty of those), 
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but also of the coalitional politics within which potentially dema-
gogic leaders operate.99 When the coalitional context is unfavora-
ble, the risk of democratic decline is dampened. 
In sum, the third pathway posits that populism presents a 
substantial risk of democratic retrogression—if not of wholesale 
reversion into autocracy. It further suggests that the specter of 
terrorism works as the fuel for populism’s ascent. 
Again, it is worth considering counterarguments. The strong-
est hinges on the connection between terrorism and populism. Not 
all populists focus on terrorism threats. In the United States, for 
example, populisms both old and new are organized around eco-
nomic grievances, as well as security fears.100 Perhaps economic in-
security is sufficient to generate pressure for populist positions. 
But the best studies available to date do not support the idea 
that economic forces alone can explain the present populist 
wave. Studying data on the shifting positions of political parties 
in European countries, for example, Professors Ronald Inglehart 
and Pippa Norris distinguish between economic insecurity and 
cultural backlash as possible theories of populism’s recent suc-
cess. They suggest that the cultural backlash theory has more 
support than economic explanations for populism’s appeal.101 In-
glehart and Norris treat security-related concerns as one of five 
potentially salient “cultural” factors and find that it is inde-
pendently predictive of populist sentiment.102 Even if security-
related concerns are not the sole cause of contemporary populism 
in the form that Müller and Urbinati have stipulated, therefore, 
it appears they are sufficiently common to be a major driver of the 
populist “explosion” currently underway. 
 CONCLUSION 
Democratic decline happens in a small, albeit growing, num-
ber of cases. Discrete case studies of its microfoundations might 
yield insight into the trajectories of particular polities. But the 
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lack of cases to study means we are a long way from understand-
ing the full panoply of its institutional, social, political, and eco-
nomic causes. The task is particularly challenging because there 
is not simply one story of democratic decline, but many. The ty-
pologies offered here are just a first step toward better under-
standing some of those mechanisms. 
This Essay identifies three potential ways in which terrorism 
might conduce to democratic recession. I do not believe that ter-
rorism directly precipitates the lurch away from democracy via 
the first pathway. Instances in which terrorism leads directly to 
a democratic recession through the strait gate of an emergency 
declaration (as in Weimar) or radical structural change to the 
state (as in Putin’s Russia) are rare and ambiguous. 
Instead, the more interesting and more significant pathway 
to consider is an intertwined version of the second and third 
mechanisms that I have described: the incidence of terrorism 
could both instigate a process of institutional change that weak-
ens restraints on coercive authorities that might be employed to 
unravel democratic practice and, at the same time, encourage the 
polity to shift toward a more populist stance, with less toleration 
for the necessary predicates of effectual democracy, such as com-
petitive elections and the recognition of a loyal opposition. These 
institutional and political changes, respectively, furnish the 
means and the motivation to engage in democratic retrogression. 
When they occur simultaneously—and there is no reason to think 
that they always will—it is quite plausible to think that their 
costs include the medium-term emasculation of democracy’s insti-
tutional and political foundations. 
This possibility merits consideration not only for its implica-
tions for constitutional design writ large, but also because it 
might influence legal interpretation on the ground. I will close by 
developing one such implication. 
It is a commonplace now that even rule-like constraints on 
governmental action can warp and buckle when national security 
is imperiled, say by a serious terrorism threat. One of the most 
sensitive and sophisticated versions of this intuition is offered by 
Professor Richard Fallon, who has suggested that “the obligation 
of fidelity to specific, constitutionally and statutorily established 
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legal norms” can give way if “consequence-based pulls of obliga-
tion to the overall legal order . . . achieve a supervening legal 
force.”103 
Fallon means to suggest that concerns about grave security 
harms can dissolve normal legal constraints. But the analysis I 
have offered cuts in the other direction. The systemic harm of ter-
rorism is more symmetrical than commonly appreciated. It is not 
only the attacker but the defensive operation of counterterrorism 
that poses a risk of unraveling fundamental predicates of the le-
gal order. In some respects, indeed, the latter danger may be 
greater because it wants for obvious indicia. If that is even possi-
bly so, a threshold deontological approach to national security 
should be structured to reflect the symmetrical risks of cata-
strophic harm to the democratic, constitutional order. There are 
devils, in short, on every side. 
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